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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

WARREN STi\CK,
Respondent,
Case No.

-vs-

EDWIN

7387

J. KEARNES,
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken by the defendant Edwin J.
Kearnes from a verdict and judgment against him. The suit
arose out of an automobile accident which occurred in the
early morning hours of October 12, 1947. The plaintiff
was riding in a car being operated by the defendant when
the car overturned as it attempted to negotiate a curve on
Holladay Boulevard at 45th South.
A trial v1as originally had before the 1--Ionorable J.
Pdlan Crockett and a unanimous verdict rendered by the
jury in favor of the defendant (appellant) and against the
plaintiff. (P'-. 93). Thereafter a new trial was granted plain..tiff which resulted in a divided verdict ( six..-t\NO) in favor
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of the plaintiff, the jury assessing plaintiff's damages in
the sum of $1859.34. (R. 106).
Because a detailed statement of the evidence will be
given in connection with appellant's argument, a further
recitation of the facts at this point will serve no purpose.

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The sole question presented for review is the error of
the trial court in granting plaintiff and respondent a new
trial after the jury had returned a unanimous verdict of no
cause of action.

ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD
. NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED

Plaintiff's motion for ·a new trial following the·verdict
.of no cause of action was based on the following grounds:
(R. 341).
I

"1. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-dict.
2. That the verdict is against the law.
3. Errors in law occurring at the trial and ex-cepted to by the plaintiff.
4. That there has been such a plain disregard by
the jury of the instructions of the Court and
the evidence in the case as to satisfy the Court
that the Verdict was rendered through a mise-apprehension of such instructions or under the
influence of passion and prejudice."
In granting the motion the court stated that it was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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basing its decision on any one ground but making its rul. .
ing without specifying a reason so that on appeal plaintiff
might argue any ground in support of the court's action.
However, no argument was ever made by plaintiff that the
trial court had committed any error which plaintiff had
excepted to. Nor does the record show any action on the
part of the trial court that might be claimed as error which
was excepted to by plaintiff.
With respect to ground No. 4, this court has here...
tofore determined that:
"In order to eliminate speculations as to the basis
of the exercise of judicial discretion in granting
new trials, the records should show the reasons
and make it clear the court is not invading the
province of the jury. The trial court should indi..cate wherin there was a plain disregard by the jury
of the instructions of the court or the evidence
or what constituted bias or prejudice on the part.
of the jury." (Saltas v. Affleck et al, 99 Utah 381,
105 P. 2d 176.)
Again, no reasons were given during the course of
plaintiff's argument on motion for a new trial in support
of the contention that there had been "such a plain dis..regard by the jury of the instructions of the Court and the
evidence in the case as to satisfy the Court that the Verdict
was rendered through a misapprehension of such instruc..tions or under the influence of passion and prejudice," ex..cept that the jury had deliberated only a matter of approxi..mately 15 minutes before arriving at its decision-a fact
which itself di~ not impress the trial court nor should it be
of any significance one way or the other. If it could, with..out anything more, be sufficient grounds to justify a new
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trial that the jury did not deliberate as long as one side or
the other felt sufficient no case would be settled by a ver ~
diet of a jury because the losing party in every event would
argue that the jury had not adequately considered the is~
sues and the evidence or it would have reached a verdict
favorable to such losing party.
The ground upon v1hich plaintiff relied in his argu~
ment to the trial court and which appeared to influence
the court in reaching its conclusion was that the evidence
was insufficient to justify the verdict and such verdict was
therefore contrary to the law. And it is to this proposition
that appellant will direct his argument in this brief.
In attacking the action of the lower court in granting
plaintiff and respondent a new trial, counsel is not unmind~
ful of the former decisions of this court to the effect that
"the question of granting or denying a motion for a new
trial is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial
court." Moser v. Zion's Co~op Mercantile Institution,
( 1948) ______ Utah ______ , 197 P. 2d 136. See, also, White v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Ut. 56, 29 P. 1030; Van
Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Ut. 606, 161 Pac. 50;
Thompson v. Brown Livestock Co., 73 Utah 1, 276 P.
651; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; Trim~
ble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Ut. 457, 142 P. 2d 674.
However the trial court is not without some limitation
in the exercise of its discretion. In the case of Saltas v.
Affleck, supra, the court held:

"The exercise of a judicial discretion must be based
upon sorr1e facts notv,ithstanding great latitude is
accorded the trial court in such matter. Klinge v.
Southern Pacific Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P. 2d 357,
105 A. L. R. 204."
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To the same effect is the ruling of the Arizona Su. .
preme Court in the case of Rathman v. Rumbeck, 54 Ariz.
443, 96 P. Zd 755, where the court reversed the lower court
in granting a new trial, stating:
" . . . the courts' discretion must be a legal and
not a capricious one; ... it must be warranted by
law and guided by established percedent."
In the case of Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co.,
73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582, the court set out the criterion
that if the lower court is of the opinion that the jury "dis..regarded the manifest weight of the evidence" it should
authorize a new trial.
Again in Valiotis v. Utah..-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah
151, 184 Pac. 802, in determining whether the trial court
had properly exercised its discretion in denying a motion
for a new trial, it was held
"This court has repeatedly held that the discretion
of the trial court, exercised in granting or refusing
to grant a motion for new trial, based on the in..sufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict,
cannot be interfered with when, upon examination
of the evidence as disclosed by the record, it is
apparent that there is a substantial conflict of evi..dence as to material issues of fact in the case rela..tive to which the insufficiency is alleged. In such a
case this court must hold as a matter of law that
no abuse of discretion is shown. (Cases supra.)
We must of necessity, however, in every such case
examine the record of the evidence for the purpose
of determining whether or not there is a substan. .
tial conflict or whether or not, as in the instant
case, there is substantial evidence to support the
verdict.''
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It was further concluded:
"If the evidence, taken as a whole, be reasonably
susceptible of opposite conclusions as to the exis. .
tence or nonexistence of an ultimate fact, depend. .
ing upon inferences to be drawn therefrom, or the
weight to be given to the testimony of this or that
witness, or set of witnesses, we must conclusively
presume the fact to be such as will support the
ruling which we are called upon to review; but if,
atfer giving due consideration to the fact that the
trial judge is better able to weigh conflicting evi ..
dence, the evidence be such nevertheless as to int ..
pel but one reasonable conclusion, and that as to
a fact adverse to the ruling, it would be our duty
as an appellate court to so declare, notwithstand ..
ing there might be some conflict in the evidence."
(Italics added.)
In a later case, the court further defined the limits of
the trial court's discretion by stating that the evidence must
be substantially conflicting on "the essential matter in dis . .
pute." Utah State Nat'l Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284,
254 Pac. 781.
Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions have supported
the doctrine that a trial court has· a broad discretion in the
matter of setting the verdict aside and granting a new trial.
But it is an abuse of discretion, stated the Florida Supreme
Court in the case of Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183
So. 335, to grant a new trial where the verdict as rendered
finds ample support in the evidence and nothing can be ac. .
complished except to have another jury review the cause.
See, also, Burton v. Spurlock's Adm'r, 294 Ky.· 336, 171
s. w. (2d) 1012.
In the case of Sparks v. Long, 234 Ia. 21, 11 N. W.
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(2d) 716, the plaintiff was struck by an automobile when
he stepped from behind a string of automobiles while cross~
ing the highway intersection without apparently looking.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and
the trial court granted a new trial. On appeal the defend~
ant argued that a new trial should not have been granted
among other reasons because the plaintiff was contributory
negligent as a matter of law. Although the Supreme Court
failed to agree with defendant's position in this respect, it
did agree that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's
motion, stating:
Plaintiff calls our attention to the broad discre~
tionary powers of the trial court in granting a mo~
tion for new trial and cites many decisions of this
court recognizing this rule. But the discretion which
the trial court possesses is a legal discretion-one
that must be exercised upon sound judicial reason-ing. It is not unlimited. Eller v. Paul Revere Ins. Co.,
230 Iowa 1255, 300 N. W. 535.
"Ordinarily this court will hesitate in disturbing a
decision of the trial court in granting a motion for
new trial when the question is one of discretion.
But we have said this 'is a legal discretion, and
must be predicated on the record.' Copeland v.
Junkin, 198 Iowa 530, 199 N. W. 363, 364. We
have examined the record in this case with care,
and we do not find therein support for the trial
court's ruling." (Italics added.)
The leading case in this state where this cour has been
called upon to review a ruling of the lower court in grant~
ing a new trial is Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138
Pac. 117 2. There the plaintiff filed a motion for a new
trial upon the following grounds:
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" ( 1) Misconduct of the jury; ( 2) surprise which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against;
( 3) newly discovered evidence; ( 4) insufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict; (5) that the
verdict is against law; ( 6) errors in law occurring
at the trial and excepted to by the plaintiff."
As stated by the court:
"Nothing was shown to support the first, second, or
third grounds. As to the fifth and sixth the bill re . .
cites that no objections were made and no excep. .
tions taken to the charge by the plaintiff, nor to
the court's refusal to charge as requested by him.
It is conceded by both parties that the new trial
was granted on the theory that the damages award. .
ed were inadequate and not in harmony with the
evidence."
In determining that the original verdict should not
have been set aside it was held:
"On the record several theories are disclosed to sus. .
tain the verdict rendered by the jury. In neither of
them can it b~ said they disregarded or miscon. .
ceived the instructions or the evidence."
And in conclusion the court stated that before the
trial court should interfere with the verdict of the jury
"it should be made to appear that the jury plainly disre . .
garded or misconceived the instructions or the evidence,
or acted under the influence of passion or prejudice; and,
since it is affirmatively made to appear that the new trial
was not granted on any other ground, it necessarily fol . .
lows no legal ground whatever existed to justify the grant. .
ing of a new trial." {Italics added.)
The principles enunciated in the Hirabelli Case were
later affirmed in the case of Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98
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Utah 525, 100 P. 2d 191, although in the latter case, the
court upheld the order granting a new trial "in the light
of the uncontroverted evidence."
With the foregoing principles of law before us, we
proceed to outline the evidence which the trial court de..termined was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
Plaintiff's right to recover is founded almost entirely
upon his own testimony, which on direct examination (and
without regard to matters of impeachment or contradic..tion established on cross..-examination) was to the effect that
plaintiff and wife, together with defendant and others had
spent the evening of October 11, 1947, at the Ambassador
Club in Salt Lake City. (R. p 167) The entire party left
the Club approximately 1:30 a. m. on the morning of
October 12th and rode up to the home of Mr. and Mrs.
Jerry Johnson located on South Temple between 8th and
9th East. (R. 168) Shortly after their arrival at the John..-·
son home, the plaintiff borrowed a car to take his wife for
their baby and take them home. (R. 169) After leaving
his wife and child at home the plaintiff returned to the
Johnsons and spent approximately fifteen to twenty min..utes there. (R. 171) Some of the group had left before
the plaintiff returned to the Johnsons and a few left shortly
after his return, so that the remaining guests consisted of
plaintiff, defendant, Mrs. Kay Bracken, and Miss Jane
Potts (later Mrs. N aisbitt). (R. 175) According to plain..tiff it was then quite late (approximately a. quarter to
three) and Mrs. Bracken and Miss Potts wanted to go
home so they asked the defendant to drive them home at
that time. (R. 176) Mrs. Johnson offered to drive plain..tiff home, but he said, "Never mind, I would go with Pat
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Kearnes." (R. 177) Thereupon the four left the Johnsons
and went out and got in defendant's car which was parked
in the driveway of the Johnson home betwen 8th and 9th
East on South Temple, about three and .one. . half blocks
from plaintiff's home. (R. 178) Mrs. Bracken sat in the
rear seat and the others sat in front. At that time, plaintiff
testified, the defendant asked if it would be alright to take
the girls home first since plaintiff and defendant lived close
together and defendant could then drop plaintiff off on the
way home, to which plaintiff agreed. (R. 179, 180)
From the Johnson home, the party drove east on South
Temple, up through Military Way into Fort Douglas, and
south through Fort Douglas to the intersection with Fifth
South Street, where Mrs. Bracken decided that she did not
want to go home because her husband would not be home
at that time. She then got into the front seat and sat upon
plaintiff's lap-it being determined that Miss Potts would
be taken home first. (R. 181) Defendant, who was operat-ing the automobile, then turned west on Fifth South and
proceeded down toward the University Stadium and 13th
East, turned left on 13th East and proceeded south to 27th
South, then left again finally arriving at 23rd East, south
on 23rd East to Holladay and south along Holladay Boule-lard to 5900 South, where Miss Potts lived (R. p. 182)
As the car started west on Fifth South, plaintiff de-scribed the movement as fast, "he started up and started· ·
fast .... I don't know how fast, but he was pretty fast,"
at which time Mrs. Bracken made a remark about taking
it easy, that she had a baby at home, whereupon plaintiff
also commented that he had a little boy, too. (R. 183)
Plaintiff further stated that defendant slowed down after
the above remarks were made and that nothing else· was
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

\Vrong about the manner of defendant's driving until the
car was proceeding south on 23rd East toward Holladay.
There was a dip in the road "and vve were going fast again
at that time, pretty fast, I don't know just how fast we were
going; it was fast, and we took this dip, and sort of mo. .
mentarily lost control of the car it seemed, and I noticed
at that time Jane was nervous" so that plaintiff said to
slow down and told Miss Potts not to be nervous. (R. 187)
Again defendant slowed down and nothing more happened
until after the car had reached the Potts residence. There
plaintiff got out and allowed Miss Potts to get out of the
car and then got back in. (R. 188)
On the return trip defendant continued along Halla. .
day Boulevard north from the Holladay business intersec. .
tion. Until the- car passed the intersection it was traveling
at a moderate rate of speed, but thereafter it continually
picked up speed approaching the curve at 45th South, so
that in approaching the curve the car was. "going over fifty . .
five miles an hour." Plaintiff stated that he noticed that
defendant made no attempt to slow down, approaching
that curve; that he observed defendant had his foot on the
brake and gas as the car started around the curve; that
the car skidded around the whole curve, with the back
wheels off the oiled surface-in fact, ''we were off it so far
we almost hit a pole sticking out ... onto the shoulder
there at 4500 South Street." (R. 195). The defendant lost
a little speed so that he was going fifty miles an hour after
completing the curve. (R. 197) Defendant was very
alarmed and stated that "we are not in that big a hurry
to get home, Pat, slow down." Defendant did not answer
but "poured it on more" approaching another curve ap. .
proximately one. .fourth of a mile away. The first curve was
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to the left while the second curve was to the right. As soon
as he came out of the first curve and gained control of
the car defendant speeded up again, (R. 199) until the car
was traveling about fifty . .five or sixty miles per hour. (R.
200) Plaintiff further testified that in going into the second
curve defendant did not slow down the car but put on the
brake and the gas at the same time, "and the car swerved
sidewards at that point on the left..-hand side of the road
clear around the curve"; that the rear of the car narrowly
missed some hedges on the left side of the road, then it
went out of control and swerved over to the other side of
the road, traveled along the shoulder, skidded sideways and
hit a street marker, causing the car to turn over. (R. 201)
Some distance back of both the first and second curves
(which were not right angle curves) plaintiff testified that
there were warning signs indicating the approach to the
curves; (R. 204) that it had been raining earlier that eve. .
ning; (R. 170) and that this was the first and only time in
which plaintiff had ridden in an automobile being operated
by defendant; ( R. 166)
Notwithstanding the foregoing testimony given by
plaintiff on direct examination, he admitted in the course
of cross examination that approximately one week after the
accident happened he had given a written statement in
which he stated, in substance and effect, that upon his re . .
turn to the party after taking his wife home, that he and
defendant "decided to take the other two girls home"; (R.
216) that plaintiff went along for the ride because he
wanted the fresh air; (R. 217) that he further stated "we
came down Fifth South pretty fast, and Kay remarked she
had a baby at home, and I said the same, and, later on, at
Holladay Boulevard, Pat went over a bump pretty fast;
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other than that, he was driving okeh." (Italics added.) De~
fendant admitted that at the time of giving the written
statement he said nothing about the car going out of con~
trol, or almost going out of control on Holladay Boule~
vard. (R. 217)
In connection with the same statement, defendant fur~
ther admitted saying, "on the way back, all three of us
were in the front seat; Pat was in a hurry and was going
too fast for the conditions of the road; it had been raining
and the streets were somewhat wet, and mud was on the
shoulders; however, I don't think he was breaking any
speed limit." (Italics added.) (R. 218)
Plaintiff was then cross..-examined with respect to his
testimony given in a deposition taken after suit had been
filed, in which deposition plaintiff admitted making the
statement that in negotiating the first curve defendant had
been traveling about 50 miles per hour, while on direct
examination at the trial he had just testified that they were
going over 55 miles per hour. (R. 221)
Again with reference to whether defendant had ap..plied any brakes as the car proceeded around the second
curve, plaintiff admitted that in the deposition he had tes..tified:

"Q. You say he wasn't applying his brakes, was he?
A. He accelerated-! don't know what he was try~
ing to do-keep the car right I guess, he wasn't
putting on brakes, I don't think, we were in gravel
and it would be hard, you see, I don't think we
slowed down any."
Plaintiff also admitted in connection with his testi~
mony on said deposition that he had made no statement to
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the effect that defendant was "stunt driving" in negotiating
the curves, nor that he had skidded sideways around the
first curve narrowly missing a pole. (R. 221)
On further cross--exa1nination, plaintiff testified that
when they arrived at the Potts' residence on 5900 I-Iolla-day Boulevard plaintiff got out of the car to allow Miss
Potts to get out and then got back in the car without say-ing anything to the defendant about the manner of his
driving; that the first time anything was said to the de-fendant about his driving after that was after they had pro-ceeded around the first curve when a statement was made
to the effect that defendant should take it easy; that he had
just made the remark take it easy and stated he had been
in eight accidents before when the car started to round the
second curve and left the highway. (R. 222, 223)
From the foregoing admissions made by the plaintiff
in the course of cross--examination it was clearly established
that his story had changed at least once and in some par-ticulars twice since the accident happened. At first plain-tiff had given the statement that he did not think defendant
exceeded any speed limit. Later, in his deposition he stated
at one po~nt defendant was ~xceeding the speed limit. But
on direct examination at the trial he testified the defendant
was exceeding the speed limit several times.
Nor was plaintiff's testimony corroborated by any of
the other witnesses with the exception of the incident which
occurred on Twenty--Third East when the car went over a
"bump" instead of a "dip." Both of the lady passengers
were called as witnesses in the case. Mrs. Jane N aisbi tt
(formerly Jane Potts) testified that she was friendly to
both parties in the action, (R. 256) and that at the time
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in question she and Mrs. Bracken were riding in the auto . .
mobile \vith plaintiff and defendant. She stated that as the
car went over a bump on Twenty. .Third East, she became
uneasy and pushed her feet on the floor board whereupon
the plaintiff said "Janey, don't worry; Pat is a good driver,"
and then said "slow down Pat"; that she had observed
nothing irregular about defendant's driving prior to that
time and did not even observe whether he slowed up after
the comment was made by the plaintiff; and did not know
whether de~endant even heard the remark; that she was
not nervous or upset at any other point and was only mo. .
mentarily upset at that time because she was aware of the
bump in the road. (R. 262, 263) She also testified that the
car did not go out of control but continued on down the
road. (R. 264) However, as the car went over the bump
she turned to look at the speedometer and it appeared to
read 80 miles per hour, but because she was looking at the
speedometer at an angle she could not state whether it was
actually reading 80 miles per hour or not; that although
she had driven an automobile for some time, she had no
independent opinion with respect to the speed of the car
and could not state that the car was traveling at 80 miles
per hour when she observed the speedometer; that the only
thing that gave her any indication that the car was travel . .
ing fast was the way it went over the bump. (R. 264 . . 266)
The other occupant of the car, Mrs. Bracken, testified
that she had ridden in the rear seat until the car reached
Fifth South and Fort Douglas, at which point she decided
to drive out to the home of Betty Toigo (one of the girls
who had been at the party) to see if her husband had taken
Miss Toigo home, at which time she went up in the front
seat and sat between the plaintiff and Mrs. Naisbitt. (R.
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281) She further testified that at no time did she observe
any irregularity in the manner in which the car was being
operated either on the way out to 5900 Holladay Boulevard
or on the return until just at the time the automobile com. .
menced to skid in proceeding around the second curve. (R.
281.-284) Neither Mrs. Bracken nor Mrs. Naisbitt testi.fied to any irregularity in the driving as the car came down
Fifth South from Fort Douglas toward Thirteenth East.
Officer Van Leuween who assisted in the investigation
of the accident testified that he and his companion had
measured that from where the car left the highway in pro.ceeding around the second curve it traveled 60 feet north
along the west side of the highway, and then crossed the
road to the east side of the highway a distance of 30 feet
and traveled approximately 84 feet along the east side "be.fore he was laid on his side." (R. 249) That in the dis.tance the car traveled 84 feet along the right side of the
highway the car was off the shoulder and one wheel was in
the ditch. (R. 255)
It ·is upon the foregoing ~estimony that the plaintiff
relies for recovery in the instant matter. Of course, the
statement made by the defendant more nearly coincides
with the testimony of Mrs. Bracken and Mrs. ~~aisbitt ex.cept that defendant testified he did not notice any bump
as the car proceeded south on Twenty.-Third East approach.ing Holladay Boulevard. (R. 295) Defendant testified that
on the evening in question he had offered to take the girls
home and the plaintiff had asked to go along for the ride;
(R. 291) that after getting in the automobile he proceeded
to Betty Toigo's residence near Twenty.-Seventh South and
Twentieth East where they stopped for a few minutes to
see if Miss Toigo had arrived home. Upon leaving there
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the autotnobile proceeded on to T-vventy..-Third East, south
to Holladay Boulevard, and then along Holladay Boulevard
to 5900 where Mrs. Naisbitt was let off; that at no time did
defendant drive in excess of forty . .five miles per hour. (R.
296) Upon the return trip there -vvas nothing irregular in
the manner in which the automobile negotiated the first
curve, but that in approaching the second curve defendant
\vas confused because of the shrubbery and weeds along the
right side of the highway and the street lights on the left,
which proceeded straight vvest along Forty..-Fifth South
Street, so that he was into the curve before he realized it.
(R. 297, 298) As soon as he observed the curve he pro..ceeded to turn but the wheels ''seemed to slide or something
-the rear ~heels went into the mud on the soft shoulders,
and I brought the car out of that turn, then vve cut across
the road to the right; I swung the wheel to the left, and
the car went down straight, then into a ditch and hit some
obstruction in the ditch, swung sideways to the left, and
rolled over." (R. 298)
In the light of the foregoing evidence it does not seem
possible that the trial court had any discretion to grant the
plaintiff a new trial. The jury had the opportunity of con..sidering all of the evidence; and, under the instructions of
the court, had the right to judge the credibility of the wit..nesses. In the latter connection the court instructed the
jury that "you have the right to take into consideration
their [witnesses] deportment upon the witness stand, their
interest in the result of the suit, the reasonableness of their
statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want
of it, their opportunities to know or understand, and their
capacity to remmeber." (R. 85). The jury having deter..Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mined the issues in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff, such verdict should have been sustained.
Indeed, it would appear that the language of the court
in the case of Acosta v. Craik, 288 N. Y. S. 868, 248 App.
Div. 209, is entirely appropriate to the facts in this case.
There the court said:
"The conflicting claim of the plaintiff's and the de~
fendant's witnesses presented purely issues of fact
which were properly submitted to the jury in a
clear, comprehensive charge that adequately pro~
tected plaintiff's rights, to which no exceptions
whatever were taken by either_ side. No errors are
claimed in the admission or rejection of evidence
or in the charge. The jury, after deliberation, re~
turned a verdict in favor of defendant, and the evi~
dence adduced, which the jury evidently accepted
as true, supports the jury's verdict. Accordingly,
it was error on the part of the trial court to set
aside the verdict and direct a new trial.''
In view of the limitations prescribed by the cases here~
tofore cited on the power of the trial court to grant a new
trial, it would appear that there was an abuse of such discretion in the instant case. In the case of Sharpensteen v.
Sanguinetti, 33 Ariz. 110, 262 Pac. 609, the court in con~
sidering the limitations on the discretion of the trial court
to grant a new trial held:
"It is of course the law that granting of a new trial
is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and
that the reviewing court will not disturb the rul.ing except for an abuse of that discretion. What
is meant by discretion in that connection is a legal
discretion, one based upon reason and law. If the
showing for a new trial is insufficient both in form
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and substance, as the one here appears to be, it
may be said that there is no discretion to be exer. .
cised. The rule that should guide the trial judge
in passing upon a motion for new trial is very well
stated in Sovereign Camp, etc., v. Thiebaud, 65
Kan. 332, 69 P. 348, as follows:
" 'The discretion of district courts in the matter of
granting or refusing new trials is ·a legal, not a
capricious, one. It must be warranted by law, and
guided by established precedent. It may not be
exercised simply because the judge might wish the
verdict to be othervvise. The test and warrant for
its use is, Has the applicant therefor shown a
legal reason for its existence?' "
In the instant case there was no reason in law or in
fact for granting the plaintiff a new trial except that the
court might have desired the verdict to be other than that
which was rendered.
However, appellant also urges that the trial court
erred in granting plaintiff and respondent a new trial for
the reason that under the evidence there was only one ver..dict which the jury could reasonably have rendered, and
that was a verdict of no cause of action. One of appellant's
requested instructions was that the court instruct the jury
to return a verdict of no cause of action, which instruction
the court refused to give. It has been held that at all events
a new trial should not be granted where it appears from the
record that the party making the motion did not make a
case and there is no reasonable probability that on a new
trial he can make a case. See Schnell v. Northern Pacific
Railroad Co., 71 N. D. 369, 1 N. W. (2d) 56, where the
court held:
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"Whether a new trial should be granted rests largely
in the sound discretion of the trial court, and an
order granting a motion therefor will not be dis-turbed unless it can be said that there was an abuse
of that discretion. Martin v. Parkins, 55 N. D.
339, 213 N. W. 764; State v.·McEnroe, 68 N.D.
615, 283 N. W. 57; and authorities cited in the
foregoing cases. But this discretion is a legal dis-cretion to be exercised in the interest of justice, so
if it appears on the record that the party making
the motion has not made a case and there is no
reasonable probability that on a new trial he can
make a case, an order granting a new trial will not
be sustained. Kohlman v. Hyland, 56 N. D. 772,
219 N. W. 228, and authorities cited therein."
In the case of Halsan v. Johnson, 155 Ore. 583, 65
Pac. (2d) 661, the Supreme Court reversed an order grant-ing a new trial stating:
"\Ve have carefully read all the testimony in the
case and have given thorough consideration to the
alleged errors assigned in the motion for a new
trial. Without discussing each one of such alleged
errors, it is sufficient to say that it is our conclusion that the jury arrived at the one and only
result that could be sustained by the facts in the
case. The record does not contain sufficient evi-dence from which the jury could have found or
inferred that the defendant was guilty of any of
the acts of negligence charged against her in the
complaint. It was incumbent upon plaintiff to
prove that defendant was ·negligent, not upon the
latter to prove that she was free from negligence."
In the case of Walters v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 320
Pa. 588, 184 Atl. 25, it was held:
"It is true we do not as a general thing reverse where
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a new trial is granted, but \vhere it is clear, as a
matter of lavv, that the verdict rendered was cor..rect on the proofs submitted, then we do, and
ought to reverse, because the court, in awarding
the new trial, has committed an error of law."
In the instant case plaintiff and respondent relied upon
three alleged grounds of willful misconduct: (R. 65)
1. That defendant drove the automobile at an exces..sive rate of speed under the circumstances.
2. That he failed to keep the car under control.
3. That he failed to keep a proper lookout.
The evidence in support of the foregoing allegations
did not as a matter of law establish willful misconduct as
alleged. Willful misconduct was defined by the court in
Instruction No. 7 as follows: (R. 71)
"You are instructed that willful misconduct is the
intentional doing of an act or intentioally omitting
or failing to do an act, with knowledge that serious
injury is a probable and not merely possible re..sult, or the intentional doing of an act with wanton
and reckless disregard of the possible consequences.
It involves deliberate intentional or wanton con..duct in doing or omitting to do an act with knowl..edge or appreciation that injury is likely to result
therefrom.''
The court further stated in Instruction No. 6 that
willful misconduct connotes a greater wrong doing than
mere negligence or even gross negligence. "It includes a
conscious or intentional violation of definite law or rule of
conduct, with the knowledge of the peril to be apprehended
from such act or failure to act." This instruction clearly
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states the law with reference to what constitutes willful
misconduct as defined by the courts of various jurisdic-tions. For instance, in the case of Howard v. Howard, 132
Cal. App. 124, 22 Pac. (2d) 279, the court held:
"Willful misconduct implies at least the intentional
doing of something either with a knowledge that
serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from
a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an
act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its
possible result."
The court further quoted with approval the following
language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the
case of In re Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 105 N. E. 601:
"To constitute 'willful misconduct' there must be
actual knowledge, or that which in the law is es-teemed to be the equivalent of actual knowledge,
of the peril to be apprehended from the failure
·to act, coupled with a conscious failure to act to
the end of averting injury."
In the light of the foregoing rules, the evidence in this
case was not sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff
had one been returned by the jury. The only evidence of
excessive speed was that given by the plaintiff himself, who
admitted that immediately following the accident he had
given a written statement in which he said that he did not
believe the defendant was exceeding any speed limit. Again
on his deposition prior to the trial the testimony was that
defendant was traveling· at approximately 50 miles per
hour. It was stipulated at the trial that the posted speed
limit for night time driving at and near the place where
the accident occurred .was 50 miles per hour at this time.
(R. 334) There was no evidence that due to the condi.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions of the highway that any lesser speed than the posted
speed limit \vas required. Therefore, defendant was en . .
titled to assume that the operation of his car, even at a
speed of 50 miles per hour, \vas reasonable and prudent.
It has been repeatedly held that speed alone is not
sufficient to sho\v willful misconduct under statutes similar
to ours. In the case of Howard v. Howard, supra, the facts
reveal that the deceased \Vas riding in an automobile being
driven by his brother. It was raining or sprinkling and
the pavement \Vas \\tet. The complaint charged that the
defendant having full knowledge of the wet street, together
\vith the fact that there was a curve in the road drove and
operated his automobile at a high rate of speed, so that the
same skidded sideways and defendant lost control of it.
After defining willful misconduct as hereinabove quoted,
the court held:
"Applying these rules to the case before us, and con. .
ceding that this driver must have known that driv. .
ing on a wet road might possibly result in injury,
it seems clear that the evidence does not justify the
belief that he increased his speed with the knowl. .
edge or belief or expectation that any serious injury
was probable. He had driven a car for six years
and this particular car for one year, had driven
it in the rain without its skidding, and without
doubt he believed he could do this again. If he may
be said to have disregarded the possible consequences of his act, such disregard was due to care. .
lessness rather than to wantonness and reckless . .
ness, and was undoubtedly based upon his belief
that no injury was probable. While he may be said
to have been reckless in the sense of being care. .
less, that is only negligence and is not within the .
statute. But the intentional doing of an act with
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a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible con. .
sequences implies the doing of such an act either
with the intent that harm shall result therefrom
or in the attitude of mind of not caring if it does
result in injury. No such intent and no such atti..tude of mind on the part of this appellant here ap. .
pears. There is nothing in the evidence to shovJ
or even indicate that the appellant in driving as he
did, even though the pavement was wet, either had
actual. knowledge or in law is chargeable with ac-tual knowledge that his course of action consti ..
tuted a real present peril, and that knowing such
peril existed he consciously and intentionally failed
to act to avoid the peril and avert an injury. The
only conclusion possible from reading the evidence
before us is that while the appellant was in a hurry
and desired to proceed as rapidly as he could, he
was not even indifferent to results but, on the con..trary, had a fixed desire to arrive at his destina. .
tion in time to attend a· dance before it closed. It
clearly appears that, although he proved to be mistaken, he thought he could safely drive as he did
even though the pavement was wet; that while he
intended to drive rather rapidly he neither in..tended the result that happened nor was indiffer..ent to the same; and that he was far from being
in such a frame of mind that he did not care whe..ther or not he injured anyone. While this driver
may have been negligent in a greater or less de..gree, in our opinion, no willful misconduct within
the meaning of this statute is disclosed in this evi... dence." (Italics ours.)
Again in Driscoll v. Pagano, 314 Mass. 459, 48 N. E.
( 2d) 1, the evidence revealed that defendant was driving
an automobile at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour on car
tracks located in the center of the paved street which was
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\Vet; that there was a sign reading "slippery when wet," and
that the guest had noticed the car swaying and wobbling
and requested the defendant to slow do\vn; that the de. .
fendant \vas familiar with the road and knew it to be slip. .
pery in wet weather; and that the car went out of con . .
trol when the driver attempted to get off the car tracks,
traveling approximately 150 yards from the point where
it left the road before coming to rest against a billboard.
In determining that speed was not sufficient to constitute
"gross negligence" the court held:
"The speed at which the defendant was operating,
in the circumstances disclosed, cannot be said to
constitute gross negligence. It is true that the road
was wet, but apart from the evidence that the body
of the automobile was swaying and that there was
a 'wobbling,' there is nothing to indicate that up to
the time the defendant reached the car tracks he
did not at all times have the automobile under
control. The same may be said as to the evidence
of the cautions that were given at about a quarter
of a mile from the scene of the accident.... We
refer to several cases in each of which it was held
that a finding of gross negligence was not war. .
ranted. McKenna v. Smith, 275 Mass. 149, 175
N. E. 474 (wet and slippery road, speed forty
miles an hour, automobile going from side to side
and twisting and swerving as it went around the
curves; place particularly dangerous, view ob . .
structed; caution as to speed). Richards v. Dono. .
hue, 285 Mass. 19, 188 N. E. 389 (speed fifty
to fifty . .five miles an hour, passing automobile on
curve, oil surface; disregard of all requests to mod . .
erate speed and not to pass another automobile
on curve; sharp turn to right to avoid oncoming
automobile, loss of control of automobile which
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turned around twice and turned over twice).
Adamian v. Messerlian, 292 Mass. 275, 198 N. E.
166 (speed forty-five to fifty miles an hour descend . .
ing particularly slippery and icy hill at night; pro . .
tests as to speed; automobile began to skid, de. .
fendant lost control and it continued to skid sev. .
eral hundred feet). Lynch v. Springfield Safe De. .
posit & Trust Co., 294 Mass 170,200 N. E. 914
(speed fifty miles an hour at night). Souza v. Mel. .
lo, 304 Mass. 552, 24 N. E. 2d 516 (speed sixty
miles an hour at 6 P. M. in October; collision with
truck standing on the side of the road) . DeSimone
v. Pedonti, 308 Mass. 373, 32 N. E. 2d 612 (speed
about forty . .five miles an hour in the evening, de. .
fendant urged to slow down or they 'would get
killed'; defendant angry and cursing; dirt surfaced
road, 'kind of rough'; automobile skidded when it
'did not take' a sharp curve)."
A case, which on the facts is very similar to the one
here involved, is Elowitz v. Miller, 265 Mich. 551, 251 N.
W. 548. There the defendant and three others got in de. .
fendant's automobile and proceeded to go for a ride. One
of the passengers sat on the lap of another. All three passengers testified at times the defendant drove at an immod. .
erate rate of speed, "particularly when turning corners,"
and that one of them asked defendant to return to the
university campus; that the defendant was told "to slow
down and watch his driving." In the course of the drive
the automobile came to a short street known as "Cedar
Bend Drive." The defendant testified that as they came
down the drive "he knew they were approaching a curve,
but reached it sooner than he expected; that as soon as he
saw it he applied the brakes; and that, had it not been for
a spot of ic·e or gravel at the corner, his 'guess' was that
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he \vould haYe made the turn in perfect safety, but that
'the car sle\ved across the road and launched over the curb
and hit a tree.' He \vas himself injured in the collision.
He also testified that his brakes were in 'extremely good
working order,' and that he had had no trouble in making
the many other turns vvhile they were driving; that he at
all times felt that he had his car under control; and that he
was operating it in a manner that he felt was safe to his
passengers and himself. His car was practically new, and
he was doubtless anxious to display his skill as a driver and
his perfect control over it."
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant moved
for a judgment which was granted and an appeal was
taken. The sole question presented was whether the facts
established willful and wanton misconduct on the part of
defendant in the operation of his automobile. In affirming
the judgment of the trial court, it was held:
"This is in accord with our holding as to liability
in Finkler v. ·Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241 N. W.
851. To sustain the claims of the plaintiffs it must
appear that the defendant had: ' ( 1) Knowledge
of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary
care and diligence to avert injury to another; ( 2)
ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care
and diligence in the use of means at hand; (3) the
omission to use such care and diligence to avert
the threatened danger, when to the ordinary mind
it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove
disastrous to another.' Willett v. Smith, 260 Mich.
101, 104, 244 N. W. 246, 247; MeLone v. Bean,
263 Mich. 113, 115, 248 N. W. 566.
"If we eliminate the testimony of the defendant that
ice or gravel caused his car to skid, of which there
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is dispute, the proximate cause of the accident was
the failure of defendant to see the curve at Wall
Street in time to have slowed down to safely make
the turn. But, as was said in Van Blaircum v.
Campbell, 256 Mich. 527, 528, 239 N. W. 865:
'Perhaps he was not as watchful as he should
have been. :(. :t- :(. This mere failure or inadvertence
or lack of care is, at most, ordinary negligence, so
called.' "
See, also, Bobich v. Rogers, 258 Mich. 343, 241 N. W.
854, in which case the evidence revealed that the plain. .
tiff told the defendant he was driving too fast, and that as
the car approached a curve plaintiff said "Why don't you
stop while I get off?" There, the court held:
"Whether a turn of the road can be made'with rea. .
sonable safety at any particular speed depends, of
course, upon the character and condition of the
road and the skill of the driver. We cannot draw
a line beyond which mere speed in making a turn
departs from negligence and becomes willful and
wanton misconduct. Conceding that defendant
was negligent in making the turn at high ·speed it
would not constitute willful and wanton miscon. .
duct. See Van Blaircum v. Campbell, 256 Mich.

527,239 N. W. 865."
"At the most, plaintiff made out a case of negli . .
gence. To recover he was required to go beyond
that and establish that he was injured by reason of
the willful and wanton misconduct of defendant.
The proofs failed to make such a case. The court
should have granted a new trial."
To the same effect are the following: Homes v. Wesler,
274 Mich. 655, 265 N. W. 492; Riley v. Walters, 277 Mich.
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620, 270 N. \\1. 160; Katz v. Kvppin. <4 C~al. i\pp. 2d 405,
112 Pac. (2d) 681; People, .. Thornpson, 41 Cal App. 2d
Supp. 965, 108 Pac. (2d) 105; Olson \'. 1-fodges, ______ lo\va
______ , 19 N. W. (2d) 676; Gill v. I-Iayes, 188 Okla. 434, 108
Pac. (2d) 117; Clark v. Hasselquist, 304 Ill. App. ~-1, 25
N. E. (2d) 900.
In Russell v. Turner (Eighth Circuit Court of Ap..peals), 148 Fed. (2d) 562, the court deterrnined:
"It seems apparent that the sixteen year old driver
of the car drove off the road because ( 1) he was
driving too fast, (2) he failed to anticipate that
the road ended where it did end, and (3) he failed
to observe the end of the road until it \vas too late
to avoid the accident. An inference that just before
the accident the car was hurtling through the
night, out of control, with its protesting passengers
being tossed about, and \Vith an irritated and ir..responsible driver, familiar with the road but who
did not care what became of himself, his friends,
or his father's car, behind the \vheel, is an inference
which, in our opinion, does not accord with a com..mon..-sense view of the evidence. The plaintiff is,
of course, entitled to have the benefit of all favor..able inferences which reasonably may be drawn
from the evidence. She is not entitled to the bene£ t
of unreasonable inferences. One fairly can believe
that the evidence in this case does not show m_ore
than the lack of care, skill and judgment which
might be expected from an ordinarily imprudent,
immature, or inexperienced, but nonreckless, dri..ver of an automobile. In other \vords, the evidence,
vie\ved in the aspect most favorable to the plain..tiff, is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that
the plaintiff's injuries \Vere the result of just ordin..ary carelessness on the part of James Turner."
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"The purpose of the Guest Statute \vas to relieve the
owner and operator of an automobile from liability
for negligence resulting in injury to a guest. To
make a case under the statute, 'It is not sufficient
to show negligence, but the plaintiff must go fur-ther than this and show a rash, heedless, disregard
of danger that would be apparent to or reasonably
anticipated by a person exercising ordinary prudence and caution under existing circumstances.'
Wright v. What Cheer Clay Products Co., 221
Iowa 1292, 1299, 267 N. W. 92, 95. 'It must ap-pear from the evidence that at the time and place
of the accident the driver :(. :f. :f. was proceeding
without heed of or concern for consequences, with
no care, coupled with a disregard for the safety
of his guest. :(. :(. :f. An error in judgment, thought-lessness, or mere inadvertence do not constitute
recklessness within the meaning of the statute.'
Tomasek v. Lynch, 233 Iowa 662, 10 N. W. 2d 3,

7."
In all of the foregoing cases there was evidence that the
plaintiff, or some other guest, had protested the manner
in which the automobile was being operated prior to the
collision. However, in each case the court determined that
such protest did not show sufficient knowledge on the part
of the defendant of the potential danger of the manner in
which he was operating the vehicle to constitute willful or
wanton misconduct. As stated by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in the case of Adams v. Doucet, ______ Mass.
______ ,55 N. E. (2d) 4:
" . . . the occupants of the automobile apparently
did not think themselves in grave danger. The
question before us is one of judgment on the evi-dence in the particular case. In this case we think
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that a finding of gross negligence \vas not war. .
ranted. Romer v. Kaplan, Mass., 54 N. E. (2d)
673."
In Katz v. Kuppin, supra, it was further held:
"The fact that a guest expresses dissatisfaction with
the manner of the operation of an automobile does
not ipso facto establish willful misconduct on the
part of the driver. Plaintiffs' contention that de . .
fendant became angry on being requested to de. .
celerate her speed is unimportant. It does not jus. .
tify the inference that she acted with knowledge
that under the circumstances it would probably
lead to injury to her guest and herself."
Nor does appellant rely entirely upon the proposition
that plaintiff failed to prove that defendant was guilty of
willful misconduct. There is evidence in the case that plain. .
tiff and defendant were acting conjointly in taking the two·
girls home. (R. 216) That notwithstanding defendant had
operated the car at excessive speeds on the trip out to 5900
Holladay Boulevard, plaintiff had voluntarily re . . entered
the car and proceeded to ride home with the defendant
without making any cautionary remarks or advising de . .
fendant to proceed more cautiously; that although de. .
fendant commenced to accelerate the speed of the auto . .
mobile after leaving Holladay Intersection (approximately
one. . third of a mile before reaching the first curve) , plaintiff made no comment concerning the operation of the car
until after defendant had proceeded around the first curve,
and that at that time there was only sufficient time to make
the statement to defendant to slow down and state that he
had been in eight previous accidents when the car pro . .
ceeded around the second curve and skidded off the hard
surface. (R. 222, 223)
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Our Suprerr1e Court has heretofore determined that a
guest is not -vvithout responsibility while riding in an auto. .
_mobile. In the case of Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co.,
77 Utah 21, 290 Pac. 970, the court, in discussing a guest's
duty, stated:

"If the guest or in'.!itee knows that the driver is in..competent or CJ.i.·eless, or unaware of an approach. .
ing danger, or is not taking proper precautions to
avoid it, it again becomes the duty of the guest or
invitee to caution or notify the operator. So, too,
if the guest or invitee sees or knows that the oper..ator is operating the automobile at an excessive,
unlawful, or dangerous speed, or in violation of
traffic rules or regulations, or otherwise is mismanaging or driving the automobile in a careless
manner, it again is the duty of the invitee or guest
to protest and ask the operator to desist; and if the
guest or invitee fails to do so, he may be regarded
as having consented to or acquiesced in such viola..tions or negligence of the operator, rendering the
guest or invitee himself personally guilty of negli. .
gence."

Again in the case of }Aaybee v. Maybee, 79 Utah 585,
11 Pac. (2d) 973, the court held:

"If it was negligence for the defendant to drive at
this speed -vvith her vision impaired as it was, and
\Vithout the aid of glasses, it would follow that,
vvhere all these facts are fully known to and ap-preciated by the plaintiff, and notwithstanding
such facts and such knowledge she vvas willing to
be driven in the c2.r, she not only assumed the risk
or hazard to her own safety, which resulted from
such driving, but, bv her acquiescence, -vvas guilty
of independent negligence which contributed to
the accident. The plaintiff identified herself -..vith
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\vhatever negligence there \vas on the part of the
n1other because of her kno\vledge of all such facts
and her approval, consent, and acquiescence in
the driving of the car by her mother.''
In Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 Pac. (2d) 224, the
court stated:
~'If

a guest sees or discovers the danger in time to
warn the operator of the car or the danger is so
obvious, or he is in such position that he must have
seen it in the exercise of due care, and an accident
happens because of his failure to warn the oper..ator of such danger, he may be guilty of negligence
which will prevent a recovery.''

We submit that if there was danger of an accident resulting from the manner in which the defendant operated
his car north along Holladay ~oulevard approaching the
first curve, plaintiff should have discovered such danger
and warned the defendant in sufficient time for defendant
to reduce the speed of the automobile before negotiating the
curve. The very fact that no such warning was given, to..gether with the evidence that the other guest in the car
observed no irregularity about the operation of the vehicle,
is sufficient to establish that there was no willful miscon..duct on the part of the defendant.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion and by way of summarizing appellant's
argument, it is respectfully submitted:

1. That the verdict of the jury should not have been
set aside by the trial court for the reason that the evidence
was not sufficient in the first instance to submit to the jury,
but that as a matter of law, the defendant was entitled to
a direced verdict.
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2. That even though the court may determine that the
case was properly submitted to the jury on the question
of defendant's willful misconduct, if any, and the plaintiff's
assumption of risk, if any, the verdict as returned by the
jury was in accord with- the weight of the evidence, and
that the trial court should not have granted plaintiff a
new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient
to support the verdict.

Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN,
Attorney /or Defendant
and Appellant.
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